Power in Perpetuity? | Commonweal Magazine

Unfortunately for the Chinese people, the contours of this space are constantly changing. The arrest in 2015 of five activists who tried to protest sexual harassment on public transport is a case in point. The CCP has long called for women’s equality and states that it “holds up half the sky.” But without realizing it, these five activists had crossed a line. The CCP viewed its effective social media campaign, increasing popularity, and coordinated actions in a number of major cities as a threat to its rule. Everyone was arrested on charges of “causing disputes and provoking trouble,” a crime under Chinese criminal law that was used almost exclusively to silence peaceful demonstrators. The five feminists were eventually released on bail, but remain under constant surveillance and are not allowed to leave China.

Religion also plays an important role in the success of local party officials, albeit only within the strict limits of the party. While the CCP remains naturally suspicious of religions, especially those with foreign affiliations and loyalties such as Catholicism, Protestantism, and Islam, local officials know that religious groups often provide social services that the local government cannot, such as orphanages, hospitals, etc. Homes for the disabled.

The 2008 Sichuan earthquake, which killed around 69,000 people, marked a turning point for many religious organizations. The Chinese government responded weakly, but local Christian churches, such as the Early Rain Covenant Church in nearby Chengdu, mobilized their congregations. Its members first looked after the injured and set up pantries, then they eventually set up permanent shelter for the homeless, a daycare center and a financial aid program for families of political prisoners. But these charitable initiatives became suspect under China’s current President Xi Jinping. In a secret trial in 2019, Wang Yi, the pastor of Early Rain, was convicted of undermining state power and running an illegal business. Now he is serving a nine-year prison sentence.

Most of the China watchers Growing up between 1989 and 2008 had a predominant view known as the “modernization theory of democracy”. The idea was that China’s economic development would inevitably lead to adopt a more open political system. That was one reason why the US supported China’s entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001. American politicians assumed that democracy would naturally follow economic liberalization, as President Bill Clinton said in 2000:

China doesn’t just agree to import more of our products. She agrees to import one of the most cherished values ​​of democracy, economic freedom. When individuals have the power not only to dream but to make their dreams come true, they will demand a greater say.

But, as Dickson points out, even in 2001 it was foolish to believe that economic development would usher in major political reforms. Deng Xiaoping was aware of the implications of modernization theory and initiated his economic reforms after the Tiananmen Square protests in 1989 to prevent further calls for democracy. Fast forward to 2021 and the CCP has outlasted modernization theory: political change has progressed incrementally compared to its robust economic development. It actually receded under Xi Jinping. But as Dickson points out in his final chapter, “Is China Getting Democratic?”, The CCP has a major flaw. Since its legitimacy depends on rising incomes, any slowdown in the Chinese economy could lead to renewed calls for political change.

Dickson’s otherwise excellent book is slightly tarnished by an omission that falls in his penultimate chapter, “How Nationalistic Is China?” Here Dickson examines how the CCP has used nationalism to increase its legitimacy. (It introduced compulsory “patriotic education” in Chinese schools after the 1989 Tiananmen protests.) Dickson spends his time tracking and analyzing the different levels of nationalism between different Chinese generations, but he fails to find a comfortable one More important issue to investigate: the devastating effect that China’s rabid nationalism has against China’s minorities and its neighbors. China is a multi-ethnic country that includes many Uyghurs, Tibetans and other ethnic groups. But its nationalism privileges the identity of the Han Chinese, the dominant ethnic group in China. To what extent has this Han-focused nationalism made it easier for the party to intern over 1 million Uyghurs or to commit countless human rights abuses in Tibetan areas? These questions would have been good.

Like any good China watcher, Dickson rejects predictions about the future of the CCP. But it shows that many of the factors that kept the CCP in power – improved economic conditions, limited protests and civil society, people’s belief that the country has become more “democratic” – still exist. For Dickson, Xi Jinping is ultimately the wildcard. Since taking office in 2013, Xi has initiated reforms that potentially limit the party’s legitimacy in the eyes of the population. He has consolidated his power and eliminated the collective leadership established after Mao’s death to avoid the dangers of one-man rule. It has increased the repression of civil society, protests and religion, and has decreased the party’s responsiveness to the people. Most importantly, he got rid of the term restrictions and failed to appoint a subsequent successor. China has outlasted most other authoritarian dictatorships largely because of its peaceful transfers of power, a tradition that Xi has turned on its head with potentially indefinite rule. Could he bring about the fall of the CCP? For anyone interested in this question and the future of China, The Power and the People is a good place to start.

The party and the people
Chinese Politics in the 21st Century
Bruce Dickson
Princeton University Press
$ 29.95 | 328 pp.

https://www.commonwealmagazine.org/power-perpetuity